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Abstract  
 
This article sets out to examine the impact of the changes in Portugal’s fisheries in the second 
half of the 20th century, with particular reference to the Northwest Atlantic cod fisheries between 
1948 and 1974, respectively the creation of the ICNAF and the Portuguese Democratic 
Revolution. Science, Law and Diplomacy are the three prongs of this work. Focusing on the 
Portuguese angle, and making use of a huge range of sources, this article deals with the rise and fall 
of the Portuguese cod fishing industry in an international context. 
The analysis is multidisciplinary in perspective: economic and social history, “diplomatic 
history” and the history of science are its foundations. Political and trade relations with Canada 
and Denmark play an important part in identifying the Portuguese government’s adaptation 
strategies and the fishing entrepreneurs involved in the main external changes of the 1950s and 60s: 
the first signs of scarcity of resources, the First and Second United Nations Conferences on the 
Law of the Sea, the issue of extending the limits of territorial waters and the setting up of 
multilateral bodies for managing the Northwest Atlantic fisheries (ICNAF, 1948). The way in 
which the Corporate Organization for Portuguese Fishing - the institutional framework 
established by the Salazar dictatorship in the 1930s - received the external discussions on the 
problem of overfishing and dealt with the threats, embarking on unheard of initiatives in external 
cooperation vis-à-vis intergovernmental organizations for the management of fisheries, are 
questions that are fundamental to this work.   
In this, as in other domains of post-war Salazarist foreign policy, involvement in 
supranational organizations was a “necessary evil” that ended up creating isolated areas of 
cooperation and openness to the advances of marine science. The most surprising conclusion of 
this article is probably this: even under a dictatorship, one that favoured a “historicist diplomacy”, 
Portugal succumbed to the principles and practices of multilateralism in order to defend its 
interests in the deep-sea cod fisheries of Newfoundland, Labrador and Greenland.  
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Introduction 
 
 In the second half of the 19th century, the industrialization of Portuguese fisheries (the 
arrival of steam seine fishing connected with the rapid growth of the canning industry) and the 
increasing perception of the usefulness of oceanographic and marine biology studies led public 
authorities and scientific bodies to increase their involvement in fishing and pisciculture. The state 
used specialized departments in the Navy to institutionalize the “fisheries services”, as well as to 
regulate technology and rights relating to the catching of certain species. In addition to these 
measures, the Portuguese authorities carried out surveys of the fishing industry, fostered 
hydrographic campaigns and encouraged the establishment of “maritime laboratories”.1 The 
technical advances in fish production and processing attracted both capital and capitalists, but they 
also provoked conflicts between shipowners; they set local and national authorities against one 
another and forced negotiations to be held between neighboring countries on the mobility of 
resources and the respective sovereignty over territorial waters. This was the case with the agreements 
signed between Portugal and Spain in 1878 and 1885. Their purpose was to protect sardine fishing 
and guarantee exclusive fishing rights for “national vessels” in the territorial waters of each of these 
Iberian countries.2 
 By the mid-19th century, the Naval Ministry Fisheries Board (Comissão de Pescarias do 
Ministério da Marinha) was already intervening in the domain of fishing and monitoring the 
imbalances in the relationship between men and sea on behalf of the state. Interpreting the 
fishermen’s complaints, the Board ruled that the number of steam trawlers engaged in sardine and 
hake fishing should be reduced.3 Fishing began to be seen as a productive industrial sector. 
 Reacting to the pressures of business associations and those of shipowners and traders 
organized in mixed-capital firms, and bearing in mind the views of naturalists, the British 
authorities also promulgated various laws in the early 20th century to combat the fishing crisis in 
the North Sea. This was the first ocean zone to exhibit the frailties of the sea fisheries in the 
industrial era. One common denominator stands out from this series of measures: even though the 
unanimous diagnosis on the state of the “depletion of resources” of high commercial value was a new 
feature, and despite being based on natural-scientific arguments, its meaning was clearly 
instrumental and presumed the defense of a return on capital from industrial fishing.4 Similar 
trends could be observed in the second half of the 20th century, in particular in the 1950s and 
1960s. 
 At the end of the 19th century, the “problem of the North Sea” led to the formation of the 
first intergovernmental organizations for fisheries management and the systematic assessment of the 
                                                
1 Inês Amorim, “A Organização dos Serviços de Pescas e as iniciativas de desenvolvimento e divulgação das ciências 
do mar – o laboratório marítimo em Aveiro – o projecto de Melo de Matos”, I Congresso Luso-Brasileiro de História 
da Ciência e da Técnica, Évora/Aveiro, UA/UE, 2001, pp. 594-605. 
2 See, idem, ibidem. 
3 Baldaque da Silva, Estado actual das pescas em Portugal, Lisbon, Imprensa Nacional, 1891. 
4 See Robb Robinson, Trawling – The Rise and Fall of the British Trawl Fishery, Exeter, University of Exeter Press, 
1996, pp. 101 and ff. 
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biology of marine resources. The most important of these bodies was the International Council for 
the Exploitation of the Sea (ICES), established in 1902 and based in Copenhagen.5 
Such a great impetus of oceanographic research and such diligent endeavors to regulate the 
fisheries were only paralleled in the period after the Second World War, a time of major 
technological change in fishing on a global scale. It was then that the theoretical debate about the 
limits of the bountiful resources of the sea and the bio-economic sustainability of the fishing 
industry was rekindled and increased in complexity. The discussion widened to cover a range of 
species in larger areas of the ocean, and not just the North Sea. Cod fishing in the northwestern 
Atlantic was one of those most heavily involved in this production-line processing. 
Given this influx of external changes, it is important to examine the role of Portugal in the 
international dynamics of the multilateral management of marine resources that was so evident in the 
third quarter of the twentieth century. Consideration must be given to the questions of how and to 
what ends the Portuguese authorities joined in the discussion on new codification systems relating to 
the sovereignty and jurisdiction of the seas. Heated arguments threatened to put an end to the legal 
term “free seas”, which for many years had sustained the singular importance of Portuguese deep-sea 
fisheries. Over the centuries, only the mare liberum allowed the Portuguese state to promote “supply 
fishing”, wholly incompatible with the strict limits of the “coastal state” that were imposed later.6 It 
was only from 1974 onwards, when it signed onto the “Exclusive Economic Zone” concept, that 
Portugal began to restrict the fishing industry to resources that were under its national jurisdiction.7 
 In brief, as our study focuses on the third quarter of the 20th century, it should be 
understood how Portuguese public institutions followed the guidelines of international fishing 
policy, in particular the discussion on the issue of “overfishing”. We shall try and assess how 
Portugal entered into the external dynamics of fisheries regulation, and how the country’s 
institutions reacted to the signs of change that they saw as threats to Salazar’s protectionist policy and 
                                                
5 On the creation of ICES and its original purpose, see O Oceano nosso futuro — O Relatório da Comissão Mundial 
Independente para os Oceanos, Lisbon, Expo 98/Fundação Mário Soares, 1998, p. 80. 
6 Fishing policies were aimed at the prevention of crises in the food supply, based on protectionist measures and on 
encouraging fleets designed to catch species for mass consumption, such as cod and sardine, an important raw 
material for the canning industry. The choice of “supply fishing” tended to overvalue public support for replacing 
cod imports by means of artificial market reserve mechanisms (import and distribution quotas) and administrative 
prices in the various circulation segments. Complying with this concept, the entrepreneurial fabric of fishing 
remained formally private and not particularly concentrated, but in order to ensure the political ends of managing 
the sector, the state imposed the sharing of “capital” and “labor” in the form of tightly supervised public corporate 
institutions. The main economic indicators for this model of political management for the Portuguese fisheries 
were, however, positive: reversing the previous trend, the “trade balance in fishing goods” was always in the black 
between 1936 and 1967; the level of self-supply of salt cod on the Portuguese market averaged around 61% in the 
same period, while between 1900 and 1933 it never exceeded 15%. See A. Garrido, Abastecimentos e Poder no 
Salazarismo – O “Bacalhau Corporativo” (1934-1967), vol. II, Coimbra, FEUC, 2003, pp. 806-807. 
7 See, M. Eduarda Gonçalves, “Le Portugal et le droit de la mer”, T. Treves (ed.), The Law of the Sea, 1997, pp. 427-
447.  
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the encouragement of deep-sea fishing as defined in the early 1930s – the so-called “cod 
campaign”.8  
 This article analyses the deadlocks that threatened to hold back the “cod campaign” after the 
end of the war and which rocked its original foundations. It might seem contradictory that policies 
be adopted that encouraged fishing in a period when the Law of the Sea was changing and when 
there were unprecedented debates about the multilateral management of resources. This is probably 
why it generated careful responses from Portuguese diplomacy. Here, as in other spheres of Salazar’s 
postwar foreign policy, integration into supranational bodies was a “necessary evil” that ended up 
creating isolated areas of cooperation and opening up marine science to progress.9 
 
1.  The geopolit i cs  of  marine resources  and technological  change in fishing 
after the Second World War 
 
The economic and demographic growth occurring in the thirty years immediately after the 
war gave the fishery problems a much greater importance and dimension. In terms of regulatory 
practices, the “glorious years” of modern economic growth (1948-1973, according to most authors) 
were ones that had marked the greatest confrontation between national policies and the interests of 
other states. The growth in the fishing industries and the expansion of fish consumption led to 
fishing policies and intensive extraction practices on the part of companies being starkly exposed to 
the judgment of the multilateral organizations responsible for managing marine resources. 
The statistics for this period show an extraordinary growth in the fishing industry, in global 
terms. According to the OECD, in 1938 the world volume of fish caught was 20.5 million tonnes. 
Twenty years later, primary world production had increased by over 64%.10  Although the criteria 
for compiling the figures may be open to question, they nonetheless allow us to compare the orders 
of magnitude per country and identify variations in growth.11  
                                                
8 The “cod campaign” is the term we adopted by analogy to another Salazarist scheme for the import substitution 
of basic foodstuffs - the “wheat campaign”.  This was an extensive state scheme to protect cereal production, 
launched in 1929 under the Fascist model, the Battaglia Del Grano. More enduring than its cereal counterpart, the 
cod campaign consisted of a political plan, imposed by Salazar in 1934, to prevent crises in food supplies. This 
protectionist scheme began to be demanded by the anti-Liberal right at the end of the First World War, and was to 
be imposed as a “national scheme” under the Estado Novo (the Portuguese New State). This was a despotic program 
that emerged from the restriction of imports and public encouragement of the cod industry, under the regimes and 
practices of free access to the resources of the North Atlantic. See, A. Garrido, O Estado Novo e a Campanha do 
Bacalhau, Lisbon, Círculo de Leitores, 2004, pp. 134-144. 
9 See Fernanda Rollo, “Salazar e a construção europeia”, Penélope, no. 18, May 1998, pp. 51-76. See also texts by the 
ambassador, Ruy Teixeira Guerra, on Portugal’s integration into Europe: Nuno Valério (org.), Ruy Teixeira Guerra, 
Lisbon, Cosmos, 2000. 
10 Politiques de Pêche en Europe Occidentale et en Amérique du Nord, Paris, OECD, 1960, p. 15. 
11 It is sufficient to note that, in the invaluable Appendix of data for the Organization’s member states in the 
OECD report that we are using, the chronologies do not always tally, and the total catch is expressed in terms of live 
weight. While this criterion might be more accurate for species such as sardine, it does, however, conceal 
considerable distortions in the case of cod, figures which seem to relate to landed weight, i.e. without taking into 
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 Just taking the simple indicators, it can be seen that, between 1938 and 1954-58, Norway 
and the United Kingdom were the two western European countries with the highest absolute figures 
for the volume of catch. But there are countries that stand out for the high growth that they 
registered in this twenty-year period: above all, there is Denmark, which between 1954 and 1958 
caught five times as much fish as it did in 1938. Next come Spain and Portugal, with very 
significant and very similar increases, both in excess of 80%. Finally, there is the growth in the 
volume of fish caught by Norway: despite the fact that it was already quite high in 1938, it actually 
rose by around 60% over the next twenty years.12  For most countries, however, the first half of the 
1960s saw a moderate increase in their catches, although by the second half they were already 
falling.13  
Between the eve of the Second World War and the end of the 1950s, Portugal’s fishing 
industry grew quickly, at a pace that was unmatched by most OECD countries. The same source 
suggests that in 1938 the total catch of all the Portuguese fishing fleets was 247.000 metric tonnes, 
and in 1954-58 (a five-year average) 451.000 tonnes. This represents an increase of 83%, or a leap 
of almost double the amount14 .  
“Atlantic cod” was far and away the species that most contributed to the overall increase in 
fish caught by European countries. Between 1938 and 1954-58, cod accounted for about 30% of 
the total increase in fish production in Western Europe. In North America, the expansion of the cod 
fisheries continued to be far lower, while Canada opted not to exploit the fisheries a long way from 
its Atlantic provinces. Until the end of the 1950s, the volume of cod caught by the USA and 
Canada was still not very significant and did not even overtake other species such as herring, 
salmon, sardine, and others.15  
The hierarchy of growth margins for dried salt cod production is quite different. This must 
be because it involves both nominal values for catches or landings, and a specific kind of treatment 
for the fish - salting and drying, which many cod-producing countries were already replacing by 
freezing.  
Of the countries that showed the greatest tendency for growth between 1938 and 1958, 
Portugal made the greatest leap forward, followed by Spain. In this period, the cumulative value of 
production (fresh and dried) for the Portuguese cod fishing fleet increased almost fivefold: a growth 
of 472%.16  In 1957, Portugal became the world’s leading producer of dried salt cod. 
These many clear signs of growth are explained by the reconstruction of both the belligerent 
and neutral economies, by campaigns promoting the eating of fish and by a large range of technical 
advances in terms of finding, catching and preserving fish. These innovations found a response in 
                                                                                                                                               
consideration the changes in weight after scaling and salting on board. Inter-country comparisons are hard to 
establish since the criteria are not uniform. 
12 Politiques de Pêche..., cit., pp. 16-18. 
13 For the period between 1957 and 1965, see another OECD report: Politiques et économies de pêche — 1957-
1966, Paris, 1970. 
14 See, Politiques de pêche..., cit., pp. 15-16. 
15 Idem, pages 20 and 25. 
16 Our calculations, based on statistics from the INE (amounts in tonnes). See, A. Garrido, op. cit., vol. II, p. 808. 
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the means of distribution and transport and in the consumption dynamics arising from population 
growth and the increasing urbanization of societies. The growth in fishing on a global level was also 
linked to the fact that countries - and also the United Nations, through the FAO, created in 1945 – 
were ensuring that people attained an adequate nutritional level. This was particularly true in “Third 
World” countries and those countries casting off the yoke of colonial domination, for which fish was 
an essential source of animal protein.17  
The recovery of the economies shattered by the war started with an increase in the supply of 
food. But the creation of large fishing fleets and the resulting increased fish production also had 
financial motives: the lack of means to make foreign payments and the exchange problems inherited 
from the war led governments to be more watchful of their balance of payments, whether by 
reducing their external reliance on the importation of livestock products or stimulating exports so as 
to obtain foreign currency, principally US dollars.18  
With a view to ensuring the expansion of the fisheries and equipping the deep-sea fishing 
fleets with effective technical equipment and the necessary scientific support, the end of the Second 
World War saw the entire “industrialized world” move towards establishing public organizations of 
an advisory nature. These bodies focused on the biology of fishing resources and studied both 
fishing and fish-processing technologies19 . National dynamics did not always sit easily with the 
movement towards the multilateral management of maritime fishing. It was not rare for countries to 
be in opposition to one another, for the reason that at the same time as they signed onto agreements 
and conventions that required multilateral efforts to restrain the economic effects of “overfishing”, 
many states were doing their best to extend their sovereignty over the high seas, so as to strengthen 
their rights to exploit the more valuable biological resources. 
 
2.  The international  management of the Atlantic f isheries - the case of  cod 
 
In the third quarter of the 20th century, the scarcity of the biological recourses exploited by 
the fishing industry became as clear as the systemic evidence of its problems, giving rise to Investi- 
 
                                                
17 As an example, the anxieties of the Fisheries Division of the FAO are particularly elucidatory. For the way in 
which this body shared the instrumental view of marine biology as a science capable of providing diagnoses about 
the growth possibilities of world fish production, see the following article: Michael Graham and G. L. Kesteven, 
“Possibilités biologiques des pêches mondiales”, Bulletin des Pêches de la FAO, vol. 7, No. 1, January-March 1954, 
pp. 1-15. 
18 See A. Duarte Silva, A Pesca do Bacalhau — campanha de 1955-56, Lisbon, GEP, 1957, p. 5. Regarding the 
monetary and financial problems that remained after the Bretton Woods agreements of 1944, see Barry 
Eichengreen, A Globalização do Capital — Uma História do Sistema Monetário Internacional (transl.), Lisbon, 
Bizâncio, 1999, pp. 145 and ff. 
19 See Roger Revelle, “The Oceanographic and How it Grew”, in M. Sears and D. Merriman (eds.), Oceanography: 
the Past, New York/Heidelberg/Berlin, Springer-Verlag, 1980, pp. 19-23; in the same book, see also T. R. Parsons, 
“The Development of Biological Studies in the Ocean Environment”, pp. 540-550. For the case of Portugal, see 
Victor Crespo, “Oceanografia”, in A. Barreto and M. F. Mónica (coord.), op. cit., vol. VIII, pp. 624-626. 
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gation and head-scratching in the vein of the “bio-economics of renewable resources”.20  
 The common, dynamic and finite nature of marine biological resources meant changing the 
scope of strictly national solutions. In the wake of the pioneering work undertaken by naturalists and 
hygienists in the 19th century, and studies on “fishing biology” whose main production can be 
placed in the 1930s, modern national laboratories and researchers came into direct contact with the 
activity of fishing.21  A science-led approach thus emerged from the issue of biological resources, 
which was legally regulated with respect to the respective access regime. 
 The increase in long-range fishing by trawlers in parts of the sea where the most 
commercially valuable species of fish were more abundant provoked the establishment of countless 
intergovernmental commissions designed to promote a concerted (and in some cases multilateral) 
management of the resources exploited by national fleets. These bodies motivated member states to 
develop scientific research, collect and organize data and compile statistics that could estimate the 
greater or lesser abundance of fish. The North Atlantic and its “northwest region”, in whose bio-
geography cod figured significantly, was the area most targeted by these abundance maps. 
 In the 1950s and 1960s, however, the expansion of industrial fishing allowed by the 
“freedom of the seas”, plus the competition between the large trawler fleets, soon led to a fall in yield 
and required unprecedented efforts of external cooperation to protect the ability of resources to renew 
themselves and to safeguard biotype diversity. Most attention was given to the deep-sea fisheries, 
greedily plundered outside the jurisdiction of the coastal states, on the basis of the old practices of 
“free access”, and using intensive techniques to exploit the resources. This was why the main 
difficulty in negotiations between “national governments” lay in reconciling restrictions on deep-sea 
fishing with those that were being adopted by coastal states in their stretches of “territorial waters”, 
i.e. beyond a three-mile zone.  
 Portugal was part of these discussions. Cod fishing had become an increasingly important 
part of the foreign policy of the Estado Novo since the Second World War - when, despite all the 
dangers of the submarine war around Newfoundland, Salazar instructed the Portuguese ships to 
continue fishing, to “bring back the bread of the seas to the Fatherland” - and this activity was 
continued and reinforced throughout the 1950s and 1960s.22  Confirming one of the postwar 
Salazarist lines of foreign policy, from 1946 onwards, Portugal took an active part in the dynamics of 
the intergovernmental management of the exploitation of the sea’s resources, particularly those that 
were of most interest to the national fishing industry. Lisbon did its best “not to be left out” and 
avoided any marginalization that could threaten Salazar’s work for the “revival” of fishing and oppose 
the social and economic interests involved in deep-sea fishing, including those of the State itself. 
  Portugal was quick to join the new international organizations set up to study and control 
fisheries; it took part in most international conferences where questions of “fishing biology” and the 
Law of the Sea were discussed; it subscribed to and ratified all the conventions concerned with the 
                                                
20 See John M. Hartwick and Nancy D. Olewiler, The Economics of Natural Resource Use, 2nd ed., Reading, 
Massachusetts, Addison-Wesley, 1997, pp. 90-137; Rui Junqueira Lopes, L’Économie des Ressources Renouvables, 
Paris, Economica, 1985, especially pp. 1-33. 
21 E. R. Russell, O Problema da Sobrepesca, Lisbon, Estação de Biologia Marítima, 1943, p. VII (from the preface by 
the translator, Alfredo de Magalhães Ramalho). 
22 An expression used in several propaganda booklets by the Corporatist Organization for Fishing. 
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legal system governing sovereignty over marine zones and the multilateral regulation of the resources 
exploited by Portuguese fleets: the cod fisheries in the Northwest Atlantic (the Grand Banks of 
Newfoundland, the fishing grounds of Nova Scotia and those off the west coast of Greenland) in the 
first place; followed by the fishing grounds for hake in the waters off the west coast of Africa and in 
the South Atlantic, at a second level of political priority. The scale of such interest underlines the 
relative importance of dried salt cod and trawled fish from Africa to the public supply.23  
 In spite of the indirect benefits and the timid scientific openings that these cooperative 
ventures allowed, Portugal played a reactive part in this international trend. In the offices of the 
Naval Ministry and the Corporatist Organization for Fishing (the power bases of the “national 
fishing industry”, at whose point of intersection stood the figure of Henrique Tenreiro)24  a number 
of specialized bodies and commissions came into being: the Institute of Marine Biology, in 1950; 
the Office for Fishing Studies, created in 1952 with funds from the Marshall Plan; and, in the same 
year, the National Advisory Committee of ICNAF (International Commission for the Northwest 
Atlantic Fisheries, today known as NAFO), whose action involved a slightly more restricted analysis. 
Only the last two bodies had a more or less direct link to the problem of the “Atlantic cod” 
fishing grounds. Their mission was related to the examination of the Atlantic cod biological stocks, 
as well as to the procedures for catching and processing them. On 19 March 1947, the National 
Commission for the FAO was also established, although its interests were not confined to marine 
fishing resources.25  
 
2.1.  The Washington Convention - the creat ion of ICNAF 
  
By the end of the 1940s, although commercial fishing in the Northwest Atlantic still 
seemed a profitable venture, several countries whose fleets were operating in these waters were 
appealing for protection for the biological populations that were being subjected to a “powerful 
extractive pressure”.26  To this end, the USA suggested holding an intergovernmental conference 
designed to foster the scientific study and conservation of fishing resources in this huge area of the 
Atlantic. 
 During the course of the eighteen plenary sessions of the Washington Conference, the 
divergences relative to the text proposed by the USA became quite clear. It seems, however, that its 
workings failed to make it clear that the treaty would neither add to nor subtract from the limits of 
                                                
23 See A. Garrido, “Políticas de abastecimento no segundo pós-guerra: a Organização das Pescas”, Análise Social, 
No. 156, vol. XXXV, Autumn 2000, pp. 656-667. 
24 Henrique Ernesto Serra dos Santos Tenreiro (1901-1994). A Naval Officer, he was a member of a distinct 
oligarchy in the Salazarist corporatist system. A government delegate to all the fishing associations, between 1936 
and 1974 he was the political patron of this sector of the “national economy”. He was a leader of the Legião 
Portuguesa, a Fascist militia, a deputy in the National Assembly and an attorney for the Corporate Chamber. For a 
biographical essay on H. Tenreiro, see A. Garrido, “Henrique Tenreiro: patrão das pescas e guardião do Estado 
Novo”, Análise Social, No. 160, vol. XXXVI, Autumn 2001, pp. 839-862. 
25 Decree-Law No. 36 187. 
26 Relatórios do Instituto de Biologia Marítima, No. 14, “Biologia e pesca do bacalhau, 1964-1968”, Lisbon, 1969, 
p. 2. 
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the territorial waters of each state - the old limit of three nautical miles, equivalent to the range of a 
cannon shot, imposed in the Modern Era. Even though we only know about the discussions relating 
to the scope of the Conference through the partial report presented by the Portuguese delegates, 
everything suggests that the omission of the American proposal was deliberate.27  Following the 
statements made by President Truman on 28 September 1945, which declared the US interest in 
extending its jurisdiction over the fishing zones contiguous with the coast, but nonetheless 
remaining outside the respective territorial waters, the American initiative in calling the Washington 
Conference and having a pragmatic convention approved that could open the way for the 
“territorialization” of fishing resources was a strong indication of postwar geopolitical changes.28  
American attempts to extend its sovereignty over the sea bed or, at the very least, to strengthen 
regulatory powers over fisheries beyond the narrow limits of territorial waters show that the United 
States wanted to take its place as the major power to emerge from the Second World War and did not 
want to act against the spirit of the “Truman doctrine”.29  
 The divergence of interests between the North American “coastal states” and the former 
European cod fishing powers, which wanted to maintain a Law of the Sea tailored to their interests in 
deep-sea fishing, namely a legal system that would leave their customary free access to the Northwest 
Atlantic banks untouched, was introduced in the plenary sessions of the Washington meeting. It 
continued to characterize relations for the whole of the second half of the 20th century. 
 In order to protect the independence of the member states of the future ICNAF, after 
lengthy and heated arguments, the Convention ended up including a subparagraph that left intact 
the right of the governments of the member countries to define for themselves the limits of their 
national jurisdictions for the purposes of fishing30 .  
 Signed in Washington on 8 February 1949, the Northwest Atlantic Fisheries Convention 
came into force on 3 July 1950, the date on which four governments ratified it: Canada, the USA, 
the UK and Iceland. The other six countries - Denmark, Spain, France, Italy, Norway and Portugal 
                                                
27 The Portuguese delegation to the Northwest Atlantic Fisheries Conference was composed of the following 
dignitaries: Rear-Admiral Quintão Meyreles (head of the delegation and representing the Ministry for the Navy), 
José Augusto Correia de Barros (representing the Ministry for the Economy), Commander Américo Tavares de 
Almeida (representing the Association of Cod Fishing Shipowners) and Alfredo Magalhães Ramalho (representing 
the Ministry for the Navy and the director of the Maritime Biology Station). See Bibl. IPIMAR, Pasta Conferência 
de Washington — Fevereiro de 1949, “Relatório do Delegado do Ministério da Economia”, fl. 2 
28 Regarding the content and meaning of proclamations nos. 2 667 and 2 668 by the American president see, 
among others, René-Jean Dupuy and Daniel Vignes, Traité du Nouveau Droit de la Mer, Paris, Economica, 1985, p. 
835 and ff. The full text of Truman’s second proclamation (on “coastal fishing in certain places on the high seas”) is 
in the bundle of documents that we have been consulting and it served as a working item for the Portuguese 
delegates from the Ministry for the Navy at the Washington meeting: see Bibl. IPIMAR, Pasta Conferência de 
Washington — Fevereiro de 1949, “Policy of the United States...”, fls. 1-3. 
29 See Charles Zorgbibe, Historia de las relaciones internacionales (2), Del sistema de Yalta hasta nuestros dias, Madrid, 
Alianza Universidad, 1997, pp. 134 and ff.  
30 This is the content of the controversial paragraph 2 of Article I: “Nothing in this Convention shall be deemed to 
affect adversely (prejudice) the claims of any Contracting Government in regard to the limits of territorial waters or 
the jurisdiction of a coastal state over fisheries”. (Bibl. IPIMAR, Pasta Conferência de Washington — Fevereiro de 
1949, “Relatório dos delegados do Ministério da Marinha...”, fl. 9). 
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- ratified the text some time later. In the mid 1960s, the number of states belonging to ICNAF rose 
to fourteen, after the controversial admission of three “Communist bloc” countries - the USSR, 
Poland and Romania, and after West Germany also signed up.31  
 Portugal ratified the Washington Convention early in 1952.32  It did not do so, however, 
before taking issue with certain provisions in the text proposed by the USA, which were seen by the 
Salazar government as inconvenient. Lisbon’s misgivings about the North American project to set 
up an agreed area to study and manage the cod fisheries were based on a common interpretation of 
the Portuguese Foreign Office and the Portuguese Corporatist Organization for Fishing: the 
Convention might compromise the national program for encouraging the development of the cod 
industry and might threaten the “sovereignty of the signatory countries”. In view of the disapproval 
of the Portuguese delegation and some others, notably Canada, the clauses that recognized foreign 
authorities’ “right to board and examine vessels engaged in fishing” within the area covered by the 
Convention were removed from the original document.33  Also dropped were provisions that 
compelled the acceptance of any fisheries’ regulations as long as they had majority approval.34  
According to reports made by the delegate of the Ministry for the Economy, in several plenary 
sessions of the Washington meeting “Canada opened fire on the idea from the United States, 
declaring its fears about an organization having regulatory powers, before the biological part of the 
fish living in the Northwest Atlantic had been properly studied”35 . 
 The long-established practice of cod fishing in deep waters by Portuguese vessels, with no 
constraints other than a lack of capital and a protected domestic market, was now exposed for the first 
time to multilateral scrutiny by a body established to ascertain the abundance of resources in the 
Northwest Atlantic. This was a body that was ready, if necessary, to impose restrictive measures on 
the amount of fishing, so as to diminish the economic impact of a scarcity of resources. 
 States with quite different interests in the cod industry co-existed in ICNAF. Views 
diverged in accordance with the distance from home ports and depending on the sovereignty that 
each member state exercised, or could exercise, over the most plentiful stocks - of fish, or oil, yet to 
be found36 .  
 A first group consisted of the North and Northwest Atlantic coastal states, some of which 
had the outer limits of their territorial waters very close to the Grand Banks. These were countries 
whose economic interest in exploiting the sea’s resources had intensified since the end of the Second 
                                                
31 See La situation de la pêche dans le monde, cit., p. 51. This study by the FAO includes a valuable synopsis of the 
intergovernmental fishing bodies created up to the 1970s. 
32 Diário do Governo, Ist series, Decree-Law No. 38 648, of 18 February 1952. 
33 See. Bibl. IPIMAR, Pasta Conferência de Washington — Fevereiro de 1949, “Relatório dos delegados...”, cit., fl. 6.  
34 See idem, fl. 8. 
35 Idem, “Relatório do Delegado do Ministério da Economia”, fl. 7. 
36 See J. D. House (ed.), Fish versus Oil – Resources and Rural Development in North Atlantic Societies, St. John’s, 
Memorial University of St. John’s, 1986, pp. 129-161. 
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World War, either for economic reasons or for geopolitical motives, exacerbated by the Cold 
War.37  
 In a second bloc were the countries of southern Europe, the former masters of cod fishing 
on the Newfoundland banks, which had never been faced with the dual threat of scarce resources 
and legal pressure in the maritime areas where they had established their “historical rights” of free 
access and free exploitation. Dialogue between those who had the cod close to their shores - countries 
which, for the first time, were threatening to prevent access by European fleets far beyond the 
generously prescribed three-mile limit - and the Portuguese, Spanish and French governments, who 
relied on fishing off Newfoundland, Greenland and around the coasts of Iceland, to supply their 
large markets, was considered by some to be inevitable and by others to be preferable to conflicts on 
a bilateral level. 
The signatories to the Washington Convention nonetheless had shared interests in 
exploiting the fish resources of the Northwest Atlantic. For this very reason, a wide-ranging 
agreement was signed “for the research, protection and conservation of the fishing grounds” in this 
part of the ocean, with the explicit aim of ensuring the maintenance of a “maximum permanent 
catch” of the most plentiful species of greatest economic interest.38   
Not surprisingly, the motive of the Convention and the intergovernmental Commission to 
which it gave rise, ICNAF, was not so much the conservation of fish stocks, but the regular 
diagnosis of how the most economically valuable biological populations were evolving, in order to 
maintain high levels of fishing with a “sustainable yield”. To this end, the reaction of the Portuguese 
Minister for the Economy, Castro Fernandes, to the report sent to him by his Ministry’s delegate to 
the Washington Conference could not have been more pointed and syncretic: “On the whole it 
seems to me that the Convention is appropriate and useful, since it will try to prevent future 
shortages of cod”.39  Showing the same difficulty in grasping the true scope of the changes in 
progress, interpreting them merely as external threats to the political ends of the cod campaign, 
Correia de Barros was declared to have said in the plenary session that “Portugal would be happy to 
see measures taken that would guarantee the largest amount of catch possible”.40  
The area covered by the Washington Convention was the northwest Atlantic. With the 
territorial waters of the coastal countries being excepted, the agreement could not threaten the 
jurisdiction of any state over the fisheries”.41  The zone of the Convention was to be divided into 
five sub-areas, corresponding to the geography of the main fishing grounds for cod in the Atlantic. 
                                                
37 See Miriam Wright, “Fishing in the Cold War: Canada, Newfoundland and the International Politics of the 
Twelve-Mile Fishing Limit, 1958-1969”, Journal of the Canadian Historical Association, New Series, 8, St. John’s, 
1997, pp. 239-259. 
38Decree-Law No. 38 648, of 18 February 1952 (from the preamble). 
39 António Júlio de Castro Fernandes, Minister for the Economy (16.10.1948-2.8.1950); Bibl. IPIMAR, Pasta 
Conferência de Washington — Fevereiro de 1949, “Relatório do Delegado do Ministério da Economia”, fl. 5. 
40 Idem, ibidem, fl. 7. 
41 Decree-Law No. 38 648, 18 February 1952, Article I. 
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The division established, in increasing order, from north to south: “the banks of Greenland; 
Labrador and Newfoundland; Nova Scotia; Maine and New England.42  
  In order to keep fishing in the various sub-areas of the Convention under surveillance, for 
the purposes of study and the possible regulation of the fishing effort, ICNAF set up a panel for 
each of them. Each Government would have a representative delegate on the panels, with the right to 
one vote, and also a scientific consultant, if appropriate.43  Based on scientific research in the 
domains of biology and oceanography, the panels could “make recommendations to the 
Commission for joint action by the governments”.44  The member states’ representation on the 
panels was considered by the Commission according to the volume of catch landed by the fleets of 
the respective countries45 . Apart from these criteria, the make-up of the panels envisaged by the 
Convention was designed to meet the demands of the North American countries, which were more 
and more interested in monitoring the activity of the large European fleets in neighboring 
international waters off the coasts of their Atlantic provinces. It was not by chance that the text 
ensured the “contracting governments with a coastline adjacent” to any sub-area representation on the 
respective panel.46  Portugal was represented on the panels of three of the five sub-areas in the 
Convention: Greenland, Newfoundland and Nova Scotia, the maritime areas most exploited by the 
national cod fishing fleet. 
 In view of the reluctance of the various member states to accept fishing regulations, the 
jurisdiction of ICNAF with respect to the study and conservation of resources was to be 
considerably wider than its powers to regulate the Northwest Atlantic fisheries. Apart from the USA, 
all the governments that signed the Convention preferred powers to make recommendations and 
advisory powers to those of regulation. 
 Fearful of the consequences of any “regulatory excesses” and anxious about external 
interference in the cod fishing fleet’s activity, the Portuguese delegation was one of the most 
intransigent in its rejection of the regulatory powers established in the draft Convention put forward 
by the USA.47  This was perhaps because the Salazar government and the fishing oligarchy felt that 
the right to conduct an external examination of the national fisheries would pave the way for 
                                                
42 The Convention covered a huge area, with the two most distant points being a place on the coast of Rhode 
Island, in the USA, at longitude 71o and 40' west, and the west coast of Greenland at latitude 78o and 10' north. 
The extension of the ICNAF Convention area to the entire west coast of Greenland, including the part enclosing 
the Baffin Sea, was not intended under the American proposal, and was approved under pressure from the Danish 
delegation at the Washington Conference. See, Bibl. IPIMAR, Pasta Conferência de Washington — February 1949, 
“Relatório dos delegados do Ministério da Marinha”, fl. 8.  
43 Idem, Article IV. 
44 Idem, Article VII, 2. 
45 Under the terms of their zoological classification, the resources covered by the Convention were fish from the 
cod group (Gadiformes), flat-fish (Pleuronectiformes) and the rosefish (Genus Sebastes). These classifications include 
cod, haddock, halibut and redfish. 
46 See Decree-Law No. 38 648, of 18 February 1952, Article IV, 2. 
47 See Bibl. IPIMAR, Pasta Conferência de Washington — February 1949, “Relatório dos delegados do Ministério 
da Marinha”, fls. 11 and ff.  
Garrido                                                                                                                            The Portuguese New State and the 
    Multilateral Management of Fisheries 
 
e-JPH Vol.3, number 2, Winter 2005                                                                                                                                            13 
infringements of the sovereignty to which the Portuguese State had not yet become accustomed; 
maybe because in the early 1950s the scientific diagnoses of cod and other deep water species in the 
Atlantic had not yet rung any warning bells. 
 What is certain is that ICNAF would be more of an advisory than a regulatory body. 
Operating at a different level from ICES - which focused on the fish resources in the North Sea - 
ICNAF was more of an intergovernmental commission to study and manage a limited group of fish 
of major commercial interest. The “Atlantic cod” covered almost all of the Convention’s area. 
 Under the scope of its advisory functions in the scientific sphere, the Commission was later 
intended to carry out “the necessary investigations into the abundance, natural history and ecology of 
any living aquatic species in any part of the Northwest Atlantic”.48  The core of this research work 
would consist of organizing and analyzing the annual statistics relating to the catch of the species of 
greatest economic interest in the area covered by the Convention, the capacity of the fleets and the 
conservation levels of the resources. Finally, ICNAF had to prepare inquiries, promote experimental 
fishing operations, and carry out sampling and other tasks to determine the stocks appropriate to 
studies of the dynamics of biological populations.49  In this, as in other research programs designed 
to use scientific bases to gauge the possibilities of fishing in the area of the Convention, it was left to 
ICNAF to coordinate national research projects. At the end of each program, all the statistics on the 
fisheries within the jurisdiction of ICNAF were published and disseminated. Some of these studies 
involved partnerships with ICES and with the FAO Fishing Division.50  
 The scientific work developed by ICNAF, which was constantly revised and discussed at 
annual meetings, saw the issue of proposals to regulate fishing, with the aim of anticipating 
imbalances in the exploitation of resources that would prevent levels of a “constant maximum catch” 
in the Convention area.51  This was the key concept of the “fishing biology” studies carried out by 
ICNAF in the 1950s and 1960s. 
To a considerable degree, scrutinizing the stocks was the province of the Evaluations Sub-
Committee: it carried out periodical reviews of the abundance of resources, assessed the effects of 
trawl nets on the biological stocks and suggested protective measures capable of allowing fishing 
vessels to “obtain maximum yield in an equilibrium phase”.52  These aims and duties included 
biologists and economists working together in order to optimize the exploitation of the cod fisheries 
                                                
48 Decree-Law No. 38 648, of 18 February 1952, Article VI, 1, subparagraph a). The other competences of the 
Commission are set forth in Article VI of the same law. 
49 Two very important international programs for reading cod otolites were developed by ICNAF. The first of 
these, a simple trial, was conducted in 1962. The second lasted from 1963 to 1967 and was coordinated by the 
English laboratory at Lowestoft, with scientists from all the Member States of ICNAF taking part. An otolite is a 
small bone in the ear of fish, and it increases in volume with the addition of one ring per year. It is extracted, 
identified and read under a microscope or magnifying glass to define statistical classes of age, based on samples. See 
Relatórios do Instituto de Biologia Marítima, No. 14, cit., p. 17 and ff. 
50 The scientific cooperation between ICNAF and these two bodies was one of the aims expressed in the 
Washington Convention. See Decree-Law No. 38 648, 18 February 1952, Art. X. 
51 The expression appears in Article VIII, no. 1, of the Washington Convention.  
52 Relatórios do Instituto de Biologia Marítima, No. 14, cit., p. 19. 
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under the surveillance of ICNAF. Albeit recent, the theoretical support for the bio-economics of 
renewable resources had already been incorporated into the Commission’s programs. 
 Reports by the scientists led to measures restricting the fishing effort, quite rare until then 
in the fishing grounds of the “Atlantic world”, and immediately approved by national governments: 
imposing alternate closed and fishing seasons; demarcating prohibition areas in certain spawning 
zones and in other zones densely populated by immature fish; fixing legal minimum sizes for the 
fish caught; legally fixing net mesh sizes and banning certain fishing gear and devices made of 
materials that were especially hostile to the depths or which did not permit “immature fish” to escape 
the nets in a condition to survive. Finally, the Washington Convention accepted that maximum 
quotas would have to be established for certain species.53  
 How were these regulatory practices embraced by Salazar’s public policies in relation to 
deepwater fishing? What was Portugal’s involvement, and what precautions did Lisbon need to 
adopt relative to a “necessary” body, in the event of its having to impose restrictions on Portuguese 
fishing in the North Atlantic? 
 In 1953, accepting ICNAF’s advice regarding the protection of haddock54  on the Maine 
and New England banks, the Salazar government began by banning vessels fishing within the limits 
of this sub-area from “having on board or using for fishing trawl nets with a mesh smaller than 115 
mm”.55  It was only in 1958, however, when the scarcity of cod in Newfoundland waters led to 
drops in operating yield - a crisis particularly felt in the rod and line fishing boats, as these were less 
agile in the pursuit of fish than the trawlers - that Portugal included the first restrictions on cod 
fishing in its domestic legislation. For the first time, there were prescriptions that applied to areas of 
the sea where Portuguese vessels were accustomed to fish: Newfoundland, Nova Scotia and New 
England. As there were still plenty of fish around Greenland, no restrictions were in force there. 
Various minimum mesh sizes were imposed on trawlers, depending on the type of material from 
which they were made.  For the very first time this new law also sought to dissuade shipowners and 
masters from the current use of devices (“tricks” or “gadgets”) that could block or reduce the size of 
the mesh, as fixed by law.56  
 Judging from the views of biologists, as expressed in the reports of the National Advisory 
Commission of ICNAF, these and other measures limiting fishing in the Northwest Atlantic were 
not very harsh. The most aggressive would have to wait for the daily experience of a shortage of fish, 
quite certain to happen in the view of the scientists. If, for most of the 1950s, the increased fishing 
effort in the various sub-areas of ICNAF was not enough to cause marked drops in yield, the 
scenario changed abruptly over the next decade. After the warning bells of the bad years of 1959 and 
1960, and the poor campaigns of 1964 to 1968, Portuguese biologists sounded the alarm: “Fishing 
                                                
53 Decree-Law No. 38 648, 18 February 1952, Article VIII.  
54 Fish from the Gadidae family, especially Melanogrammus aeglefinus. Haddock fishing only started on a large scale 
in the northwestern Atlantic in 1946. 
55 Diário do Governo, Ist series, Ordinance No. 14 313, 26 March 1953. 
56 See idem, Ordinance No. 16 628, 15 March 1958. 
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efforts are extremely intense and, in the long term, their level could be prejudicial to the 
maintenance of the populations and prevent them from achieving suitable levels of yield” .57  
 For the first time there was statistical proof that cod catches were increasing more slowly than 
the activity of fishing, with hints of a fall in productivity for boats and the strong likelihood of a low 
return on capital for the owners.58  There were some parts of the sea in which ICNAF was already 
witnessing a fall of 40% per effort unit in overall catch59 . As far as scientists were concerned, not 
even the increase in fishing in the more northerly sub-areas - Greenland and Labrador - could deny 
that the prospect was gloomy. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
57 Relatórios do Instituto de Biologia Marítima, No. 14, cit., pp. 21-22. 
58 Activity indices for fishing were measured in units of time spent by the vessels in the fishing grounds. 
59Relatórios do Instituto de Biologia Marítima, No. 14, cit., p. 22. 
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Optimism in relation to the infinite abundance of the “Atlantic cod” began to be much less 
unanimous. Scientific diagnoses began to coincide with the practical daily impressions of fishermen, 
masters and shipowners. 
As Figure I shows, cod catches in the vast shallows of Newfoundland were already falling off 
by the mid-1950s, being frequently offset by the good fisheries to the west of Greenland. Matters 
got worse. In the 1964 and 1968 campaigns, for example, over half the cod fished by rod and line 
came from the Greenland sandbanks, where Portuguese trawlers scarcely went. This was done to 
avoid extra costs and because the concentration of “rod and line boats” was discouraging them from 
frequenting these fishing grounds. Portuguese trawlers only went to the waters of Labrador. And 
they went there increasingly in the 1960s, to the point where, in the 1965 campaign, the tonnage of 
the cod caught in this ICNAF sub-area was now greater than the tonnage caught in 
Newfoundland.60  
According to the conclusion of ICNAF’s biologists, the growth in catches in the two 
northerly ICNAF sub-areas (Greenland and Labrador) stemmed from biological populations 
subjected a little while earlier to intensive exploitation, while the Newfoundland stocks would lose 
the ability to renew themselves owing to the extractive pressure to which they were being 
subjected.61  
The abundance map for Northwest Atlantic cod began to change more frequently than 
usual. The distribution of shoals was becoming ever more unpredictable, forcing ships to look for 
more prolific waters. Entering this vicious cycle, it was not long before abundance became accidental, 
almost allegorical, and scarcity was the harsh reality that had to be faced. As was only to be expected, 
these signs of change provoked a certain deepening of scientific research under ICNAF and paved 
the way for a number of measures to regulate cod fishing. 
 In the mid-1960s, the situation of the cod fisheries in the area covered by the ICNAF 
Convention was approaching a “critical phase”.62  Convinced of this, ICNAF experts had already 
recommended that the Commission should not hesitate to adopt other means to protect the 
biological resources envisaged in the Washington Convention. The various legal rules on increasing 
net mesh size, imposed since the early 1950s, were not very effective, given that hundreds of stern 
trawlers used devices applied to the upper side of the bags to counter their selective effect by 
preventing the smaller fish from escaping. Biologists warned that the “shields” (pieces of leather 
buckled to the bag to stop the nets from being badly damaged when dragged along the bottom) 
stopped small fish from escaping. 
In light of the ineffectuality of the measures regulating meshes, the problem of checking 
their compliance and the proven deterioration of the potential to renew stocks, a Permanent 
Committee for Measures to Regulate the Fisheries was set up under ICNAF in 1967. This body 
put forward proposals that were much more drastic than the simple legal imposition of mesh sizes 
                                                
60 See idem (Fig. 3 attached, non-numbered page). 
61Idem, p. 22. 
62 Idem. 
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on nets. According to the experts, the time had come to impose quotas or maximum catches.63  Such 
measures were as effective for safeguarding the renewal of the biological resources as they were 
difficult to enforce. 
 Then as now it was not possible to establish measures to preserve resources without prior 
knowledge of the ecosystems of the species that were intended to be protected from “overfishing”. 
The northwest Atlantic was one of the ocean’s richest zones in terms of commercially valuable fish, 
but it had been poorly studied by oceanographic scientists, and so ICNAF gave priority to 
hydrographic studies. The hydrological conditions of the sea were characterized on the basis of data 
collected on the initiative of the Commission’s Member States, and by ICES, in the five sub-areas of 
the Convention. The explicit goal of these studies only confirmed the pivotal reasons for which 
ICNAF was set up: “Trying to establish (…) correlations between the abundance of fish and the 
environmental conditions”.64  No less essential for estimating the potential to catch and for mapping 
the abundance of resources were the knowledge of currents and the movement of water masses. This 
was the justification for hydrological research to focus on those areas of the sea where fish were 
plentiful and there were good prospects for increasing fisheries, leaving for a later date those where 
signs of “overfishing” had already been noticed. 
 Among the first areas to be studied was Greenland. The growing importance of cod fishing 
in the coastal coves and off the shores of this large Arctic island justified the delayed research that 
ICNAF carried out there. The scientific explanation for this interest was fairly obvious and did not 
dispel the impression that Portuguese fishermen and masters had noticed in the harvests of the mid 
1950s: an increase in seawater temperature was observed in the Greenland waters, a powerful 
indication of more fish.65  
 Most notable among the second areas to be studied was Labrador, in whose waters fishing 
had been declining, without there being any convincing explanations for this scarcity. 
 Regulation of the fisheries in the Convention sub-area of Newfoundland, the most fruitful 
of all sandbanks, seems to have been the most difficult and controversial. Investigations led by 
ICNAF and the first measures taken to conserve Newfoundland's resources were halted early on by 
the divergence of economic interests relative to the fishing of certain more commercially valuable 
species. If the problems in gathering reliable statistical information on the biological reserves of cod 
soon ceased to be a major obstacle, greater embarrassment was caused by the expansion of the 
demand for fish by the processing industries of the Canadian and US Atlantic provinces. From 
1954 onwards, thanks to technical innovations, many of these “companies” began to fillet large 
catches of small cod, often less than 35 cm in size, and other fish that should have been left to 
grow.66  Catching small fish was no longer an economic problem. Capitalists investing in the means 
of production needed to make full use of the by-products; the expansion of refrigeration chains, 
from production on the high seas to the large and small urban markets, was a driving force behind 
                                                
63 Idem, pages 24 and 28. 
64 Boletim da Pesca, “A Comissão Internacional das Pescarias do Noroeste do Atlântico...”, cit., p. 16. 
65 Oral evidence from Captain Francisco Correia Marques (30 October 2001). 
66 See Boletim da Pesca, “A Comissão Internacional das Pescarias do Noroeste do Atlântico...”, cit., p. 18. 
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new commercial products. Finally, even the increased production of meal was making immature fish 
an essential raw material, rather than a waste product. 
 As usual, technological innovation, market dynamics and pressure from the fish processing 
industries on land, whose growth the Canadian government began to support in the 1950s, 
threatened to compromise the efforts at achieving a balanced management of the seas’ resources.67  
Leaving the fish-abundant waters of Newfoundland to the mercy of any kind of small-meshed net 
would be to put the future of the fisheries at risk. Under ICNAF, a serious confrontation began to 
develop between the countries of southern Europe, which caught cod for salting and drying, and the 
others (especially Canada and the USA), which fished to supply the freezing industry. Suddenly the 
former were finding, in the cultural tradition of their dried salt cod markets, a powerful argument 
for the diplomatic game. Motivated by the greater demand for medium and large-sized fish, the 
fishing carried out by the large Iberian fleets was far more selective than that of their North 
American competitors, more and more so when the fish was caught by rod and line and not by the 
implacable trawl nets. 
 Judging by the negotiations that took place in 1956 to regulate fishing in ICNAF sub-areas 
3, 4 and 5, Portuguese diplomacy succeeded in using this “ecological” argument quite skillfully.68  
In this “good fishing” year, among the large European fleets only the Portuguese fished for cod with 
rod and line within the Convention zone. Specific treatment was demanded for the trawling gear 
defined by ICNAF following the recommendation of the London Conference in 1946: fixing 
minimum trawl net mesh at 102 mm for the Newfoundland sub-area and 114 mm for that of 
Nova Scotia. 
 In light of these measures, which overlooked the singularity of the rod and line fishing 
performed from the sailing and motor boats of the legendary Portuguese “white fleet”, on 28 June 
1956 Portugal asked the diplomatic missions of the signatory countries to the Washington 
Convention to consider three amendments intended to regulate fishing with rod and line. The 
proposals were approved unanimously.69  Ten years later, when proof was found of “overfishing” in 
the waters around Greenland, Denmark forced even more drastic measures by proposing that the 
Store Hellefisk Bank (division 1B in the ICNAF Convention area) should be closed to trawlers. The 
Danish government argued that fishing for cod with rod and line, almost the only means of survival 
for the people of Greenland, would be threatened by the depletion caused by the trawl nets.70  
 But the swiftness with which the Commission dealt with the requests to protect fishing with 
rod and line put forward by Portugal and Denmark does not suggest any other convergence of 
interest between the two states. On the contrary, the divergence of views with respect to the issue of 
                                                
67 Miriam Wright, op. cit., pp. 51 and ff. 
68 The perception that the Washington Conference could lay down “international limitations or conditions” on 
trawling activity in the Northwest Atlantic, and that in this situation fishing from boats using the rod and line 
technique should not be restricted, was mentioned even before this meeting took place and was discussed by the 
Ministry for the Sea’s Directorate of Fisheries and H. Tenreiro. See Bibl. IPIMAR, Pasta Conferência de Washington 
— Fevereiro de 1949, “Nota 1836”, fls. 1-2. 
69AHMNE, RQE, Proc.º 44, 17, 2º P, A 61, M 317, Pasta 2, Regulamentação Internacional da Pesca do Arrasto. 
70 See Relatórios do Instituto de Biologia Marítima, No. 14, cit., pp. 24-26. 
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the limits of Greenland’s territorial waters was soon to worsen. In May 1963, Copenhagen alarmed 
Lisbon with a unilateral proclamation that extended the island’s territorial waters from three to 
twelve miles.71  
 
2.2.  Por tugal  in ICNAF: mult i lat eral i sm and autarky 
  
Given the limitations of scientific activity in Portugal and the political constraints on the 
integration and cooperation of scientists in intergovernmental organizations, the active role of 
Portugal in ICNAF might seem strange. 
 In this, as in other spheres of postwar external cooperation, Salazar's government signed on 
in order not to be left out. Safeguarding the Northwest Atlantic fishing grounds and keeping intact 
the web of interests that the Estado Novo had ceased to weave around the cod campaign required 
unprecedented efforts at cooperation in multilateral organizations for the study and management of 
the fisheries. These were undertakings that were perhaps at odds with the strictly national dynamics 
of the corporate administration of fishing, contrary to its closed and oligarchic direction, proper to a 
political organization with strong New State connotations, and wrought from authoritarian powers, 
even ones with suggestions of fascism. 
 
 Even considering the pragmatic adaptations of postwar Salazarist diplomacy, the readiness 
with which Portugal joined ICNAF and the active part it sought to play within the Commission are 
unambiguous.72  
 Of all the agreements accepted under ICNAF, the one that caused the most embarrassment 
to the authorities in Lisbon was that of proving information on the activity of the Portuguese cod 
fishing fleet. Between the wish to comply with the agreement of some leaders of fishing’s corporate 
oligarchy, the fine perception of what was changing in deep-sea fishing, borne out by others 
(especially by António Duarte Silva73 ) and the power of Tenreiro to persuade the Foreign Ministry 
to sign the agreements that he felt were essential for the “protection” of fishing, Salazar’s foreign 
policy redoubled its concern with defending the “national interest” when it came to deep-sea fisheries 
and sovereignty over the seas. 
 The Washington Convention envisaged the establishment of national ICNAF advisory 
committees. There were countries which never bothered to establish theirs. Portugal, however, was 
                                                
71 See A. Garrido, op. cit., vol. II, pp. 581-583.  
72 In the second mandate of ICNAF, which began in 1953, a Portuguese member was elected Vice-President — 
Commander Américo Angelo Tavares de Almeida (1898-1972). In the third mandate, after 1955, he was elected 
President of the Commission, a post he held until 1957. In addition to this involvement, the efforts of the 
Portuguese Commissioner to convene an annual meeting of ICNAF in Lisbon were neither small nor in vain. The 
first meeting to be held outside North America took place in Lisbon, in 1956. The Scientific Committee of 
ICNAF also came to be presided over by a Portuguese member, Mário Ruivo. 
73 António Álvares Pereira Duarte Silva (1904-1981). Born in Figueira da Foz, a lawyer and shipowner and, until 
the April 1974 Revolution, always a top leader of the Corporate Organization for Fishing. A large number of the 
policies for the cod industry established by Henrique Tenreiro resulted from studies carried out by Duarte Silva 
and the opinion that he proffered. 
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one of the first Member States to create a National Advisory Committee for the Northwest Atlantic 
Fisheries. It did so in mid-1952. A few months later, the Convention was ratified. The justification 
given in the preamble to the law does not hide the reasons for such haste: it is stressed that the 
agreement relates to those zones of the sea where the national cod fishing fleet had been fishing for 
many years, with the greatest interest being in cooperating in all the work of the bodies that had been 
established, or due to be set up after the Convention came into force.74  Collaboration in order to 
avoid being marginalized was once again the order of the day. This meant an opening up to the 
outside world that was as unwanted as it was essential, in order to keep a close watch on what was 
changing in the cod fishing grounds and to reject any measures that were hostile to the progress of 
the cod campaign. 
As was usual in the shifting sands of the Organization for Fishing, the Decree setting up the 
ICNAF National Advisory Committee subtly introduced a force for influencing fishing policies and 
renewing the cod fleet, based on a scientific report on the problem of conserving resources. 
 Struggling with the serious problems of organizing the work and with the fact that there 
were few marine biologists in Portugal, the ICNAF National Advisory Committee could not fulfill 
all the objectives ascribed to it under the law: “To study all the problems of fishing in the area 
covered by the Convention, to acquire and gather all the elements required for this study and 
compile reports, data or opinions that will enable the Government to decide on the direction to be 
taken by the representatives of Portugal”.75  Relying on a president appointed by the Minister for 
the Navy76  and by a few representatives of the various ministries involved in managing both 
fishing and the corporatist bodies set up for the economic coordination of cod fishing - among 
which the name of Henrique Tenreiro looms large – the ICNAF Advisory Committee remained 
under the protective wing of the Directorate-General for the Navy. The headquarters of the 
Committee was linked to the newly created Office for Fishing Studies, i.e. remaining safely within 
the corporate oligarchy. 
 Despite the sparse financial support given by the Portuguese government to these “attempts 
at multilateralism”, the participation of Portugal in research tasks was ensured by the scientific 
interest of the members of the Navy department’s advisory bodies on fishing - especially of a few 
officials linked to the hydrographic services, whose oceanographic awareness and knowledge was 
more refined - and the political need to meet the obligations assumed in Washington. 
The scientific input from each member state to ICNAF’s investigations was in proportion to 
the fishing effort of the respective fleet in the Convention area. The immediate goals of the body were 
to assess stocks and the effects of fishing on the capacity for resource renewal. This program was 
beyond the individual capabilities of each country, requiring as it did expenditure and specialized 
personnel in order to carry out sampling programs in huge areas of the sea. 
One of the difficulties most noticed by ICNAF scientists seems to have been the 
international standardization of methods and techniques for identifying the dynamic characteristics 
                                                
74 Diário do Governo, Ist series, Decree No. 38 806, of 30 June 1952. 
75 Idem, Article II. 
76 Rear-Admiral António Francisco Alves Leite, who, up to 1961, combined the post of President of the 
Committee with that of President of the Office for Fishing Studies. 
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of the fishing stocks. According to the “fishing biology” standards of the day, the features of 
biological populations that most caught the attention of the scientists were their potential for growth 
and reproduction, the feeding and migration habits of the more commercially valuable species, as 
well as “natural mortality” indices and those resulting from fishing. In order to diminish the 
differences between the technical process of “determining the age of fish by counting the annual 
rings on the scales”, as well as to harmonize the techniques of reading otolites and other scientific 
methods of characterizing the stocks, a scientific meeting was held in Lisbon in May 1957 to discuss 
the “population dynamics and selectivity of the fishing effort”. The meeting was sponsored by the 
FAO, ICNAF and ICES.77   
 
2.3.  Diagnoses and intergovernmental  re search project s 
  
In the early years, and under the impetus of the ICNAF Scientific Research Committee, the 
work of the National Advisory Committee concentrated on collecting and compiling the statistical 
data relating to fishing by Portuguese vessels in the Convention area. This was an important task, 
especially as fishing statistics in Portugal barely considered biological variables, and had never been 
discussed with the need to determine “conversion factors” that could transform the global figures for 
the fish landed into values for the total fresh catch taken from the sea, or into “real catch”, as 
requested by ICNAF.78  
 In terms of biology, the main commitment of Portugal as a member state was that of 
sampling. This meant the standardized collection of cod on board trawlers and “rod and line boats”, 
so as to calculate the maximum possible catch levels by assessing the degree of maturity of the 
biological populations and the understanding of the migratory behavior of cod. This knowledge was 
crucial for effective detection and for preventing falling yields. 
 For this purpose, the ICNAF National Advisory Committee organized a group of samplers 
who would be on board during the several months of the campaign. Among them, “biologists” were 
still an exception. A young biologist from the Portuguese Institute of Marine Biology, Mário Ruivo, 
whose political activism in the clandestine cells of the PCP (the Portuguese Communist Party) did 
not prevent the Organization for Fishing from keeping him in its bodies involved in studying 
fisheries, was involved in Portuguese research into cod between 1954 and 1961.79  The work he 
directed took place on board the Portuguese fleet’s trawlers and rod and line vessels, with the aid of 
assistant-observers. Other tasks were carried out in the laboratory of the hospital ship Gil Eannes.80  
The sampling “covered the parameters fundamental to the study of population dynamics - such as 
                                                
77 See Boletim da Pesca, “Pescarias e cooperação internacional...”, cit., p. 17. 
78 Idem, “A Comissão Internacional das Pescarias...”, cit., p. 19. 
79 See Mário Ruivo, “Ciência e gestão dos recursos haliêuticos na segunda metade do século XX – o bacalhau no 
Atlântico Norte: um caso paradigma”, in A. Garrido (coord.), A Pesca do Bacalhau – História e Memória, Lisbon, 
Editorial Notícias, 2001, p. 350. Although under the watchful eye of the PIDE [the secret police], the skill of the 
young biologist, and maybe the fact that the repressive apparatus of the regime did not see any risks of “ideological 
contamination” in laboratory work that were comparable to those of teaching, could help to explain this 
remarkable cohabitation. 
80 See A. Duarte Silva, op. cit., p. 15. 
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composition by size, sex and degree of maturity, the collection of otolites for establishing age, 
analysis of stomach contents - complemented in the fishing zones by other relevant observations”.81  
 The work was painstaking, lengthy and costly, and was far from guaranteeing scientifically 
reliable results.82  It may be observed, for now, that the “fishing biology” was virtually confined to 
trying to estimate changes in stock abundance with a view to establishing “maximum sustainable 
catches”. In the absence of a research vessel, towards the end of the 1950s, in addition to the 
sampling, observations were made on the rod and line boats to check for any correlation between the 
conditions in the seawater (temperature and salinity) and fishing yield. Such methodologies were 
increasingly close to current trends. 
On a horizon dominated by rough knowledge gained from campaigns of plenty, the 
practical and intuitive knowledge of the masters and fishermen came up against the discourses of 
science. Certainly the dialogue between the men fishing for cod and the scientists was always a very 
delicate one, characterized by mistrust on the part of the former and constantly postponed by the 
relative abundance of fish - an abundance which, in 1956, in relation to the Newfoundland 
sandbanks, the ICNAF studies still did not refute.83  But because the scenario at that time was 
already a little bleaker with respect to species related to cod, the Boletim da Pesca (The Fishing 
Journal) for that year called for everyone to cooperate in the biological research: “From the humblest 
fisherman who collects a marker to the ship’s master who facilitates the work on board his vessel, 
and the officials who can create the conditions needed for serious scientific research that is properly 
directed and equipped with the means to act, then it will be possible to accomplish the program 
outlined and reap the rewards of this international collaboration for the balanced exploitation of 
natural resources”.84  If the Boletim is to be trusted, retrieving the marked fish was a task that the 
Portuguese fishermen performed zealously, on board their dories, on the orders of the captains.85  
These latter figures had to record the length of the specimens, as well as the date and place of their 
capture, and then send them to the Grémio dos Armadores (the corporatist shipowners’ association), 
and thence to the laboratory. In an authoritarian state, it is amazing and paradoxical that the motive 
of “national interests” allowed the various actors in fishing the dynamics of cooperation in scientific 
                                                
81 Mário Ruivo, art. cit., p. 352. 
82 Those who recognized it were the scientists who signed the Report used here as a source, Rui Monteiro and 
Manuel Lima Dias. See Relatórios do Instituto de Biologia Marítima, No. 14, cit., p. 7. 
83 See Boletim da Pesca, “A Comissão Internacional das Pescarias do Atlântico Noroeste...”, cit., pp. 17-18. It is 
enough to highlight the educational discourse of this periodical, published by the Office for Fishing Studies, 
concerning the importance and demands of Portugal’s cooperation in the multilateral bodies engaged in studying 
and managing the fisheries. The role of the Boletim in disseminating new fishing and fish processing technologies 
seems to have been no less important. 
84 Idem, p. 20. 
85Idem, p. 19. 
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programs, which bore practical similarities with certain “cooperative models” for the regulation of 
fishing that are recommended today.86  
  
2.4.  General  overview and instrumental  re sults 
  
It is not easy to assess the practical effects of these investigations and the scientific opinion 
that they engendered, which in turn led to the general management of the cod fisheries. Yesterday, as 
is the case today, the policies of renewing the fishing fleet and regulating the technological systems 
for catching fish were the topics most likely to gauge the impact of scientific diagnoses on the greater 
or lesser abundance of resources. 
 If we compare the annual reports of the ICNAF National Advisory Committee with the 
public opinions relating to the renewal of the Portuguese cod fishing fleet, it is immediately clear 
that the applied research developed between 1948 and 1974 with the help of the Biological Marine 
Institute was restricted to the abundance of resources and the estimation of catch potential, in 
accordance with the need to supply the national cod market. The autonomy of the scientific discourse 
emanating from technical and advisory bodies in the area of fisheries and affecting the political 
decisions taken was thus very limited, shackled and conditioned by the system of authority over 
national fishing: Tenreiro, from the side of the Corporatist Organization for Fishing, and the Cod 
Trade Regulatory Commission (CRCB), in the exercise of its powers of public economic 
coordination. 
 Regarding the outcome of the research undertaken by the ICNAF National Advisory 
Committee, it is no less scandalous that scientific opinion was snuffed out in the face of the 
instrumental goals of its application. The inclusion of ICNAF investigations in the fleet renewal 
programs, considered by the CRCB under the scrutiny of the “government of the Nation”, appear 
to be fairly scarce. The annual reports from the National Advisory Committee became a dead letter, 
even though they were kept in the ICNAF Yearbook and summarized in other documents emanating 
from the annual meetings of the organization.87  The state invariably looked only at such research 
results in order to see the catch possibilities for the Portuguese fleet in the ICNAF Convention area, 
and to use them to chart the supplies for the national cod market. The prevailing viewpoint of 
“supply fishing” made any investigations by the advisory bodies and specialist committees on 
national fisheries virtually ineffectual. 
 As happened in other countries interested in developing their fishing industries, in the 
third quarter of the twentieth century “fishing biology” became a “state science” in Portugal, 
developing the advantages, drawbacks and regulatory concerns of applied research. Even so, the 
technical and advisory bodies on fishing created after the Second World War permitted the 
narrowest of openings to international cooperation, somewhat isolated in the panorama of scientific 
research in the Salazarist period. Whether through the regular participation of its researchers in 
                                                
86 For thoughts on some of these management models for the “Atlantic cod” fisheries, see, among others, Barbara 
Neis; Lawrence Felt (ed.), Finding Our Sea Legs – Linking Fishery People and Their Knowledge with Science and 
Management, St. John’s, ISER of the Memorial University of Newfoundland, 2000. 
87 Some of these annual reports published by ICNAF are still in the IPIMAR library, in Lisbon. See “Portuguese 
Research Report, 1963”, ICNAF Redbook - 1964 (II) and the same document for the years 1964, 1965 and 1966. 
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international meetings or due to the need to plan and present statistics, the contact that was enjoyed 
with more evolved scientific research centers, working in the area of fisheries, did, in fact, yield 
positive results.88  
 With respect to the technologies used in fishing and processing the catch, despite the 
activities of the Office for Fishing Studies89  and the Geographical Missions and Colonial 
Investigations Board90 , there never was a national drive for research in these domains, which partly 
explains the obstacles raised to the reorganization of the sector. 
 In the 1950s and 1960s, the activities of the public research bodies were centered on the 
“classic” issues of detecting, prospecting and mapping resources. With the exception of the work of 
the Biological Marine Institute, designed to study the fishing resources of the Portuguese coast 
(especially sardine), through which passed a good many of the future national elite of “marine 
biologists”, the outcomes of the investigations conducted by the various organizations and advisory 
committees were scarcely reflected in the “national fishing policy”. Even though Portugal promptly 
ratified the International Convention on Overfishing, which warned of the need to adapt catch 
potential to the capacity for resource renewal, the plans made to encourage fishing in the 1950s and 
1960s totally ignored the question of the rational exploitation of stocks. Empiricism and an illusory 
belief in the infinite capacity of marine resources to renew themselves certainly still prevailed over the 
discourse and practice of the economic agents in the sector and the majority of those responsible for 
fishing policy. It is certain, too, that in the third quarter of the twentieth century the management of 
fish resources was based on extremely simple, linear models developed to study the dynamics of 
biological populations. These were mechanistic models, whose reading of the variations in stock 
abundance tended to overestimate the impact of fishing but did not include environmental factors 
and did not gauge the effects of these phenomena on biodiversity.91   
  “Fishing biology” studies - still embryonic in Portugal, and with little hope of becoming 
established in the institutional framework of the Corporate Organization - and even the sampling 
work on the “Atlantic cod” carried out as part of the commitment made to ICNAF, had absolutely 
no influence on the essence of political decision-making in relation to encouraging deep-sea fishing. 
There was a total lack of any ecological discourse or awareness with respect to the problem of 
“overfishing” and of the need to adjust the capacity of the fleets to a “sustainable” level for the 
exploitation of resources. Finally, the political preoccupation with ensuring the survival of the cod 
fleet, “supporting” shipping firms and foreseeing the instability of the supply to the domestic 
market put ecological discourse and practice firmly in second place, so that it became nothing more 
than instrumental. The metaphor of the “drop in the ocean” that some biologists used to characterize 
                                                
88 This positive assessment is borne out, for instance, by Prof. Mário Ruivo (interview, Lisbon, 20.4.2001). 
89 This office was set up under Decree-Law No. 38 638, of 9 February 1952. Incorporated into the Corporative 
Organization for Fishing, its purpose was to “study the problems related to the various fishing methods and its 
workers and to try to find practical solutions for them” (Article I). As with other technical organizations on fishing, 
the Office struggled with a lack of funding. Its operations depended on income or annual contributions from 
shipowners’ associations. 
90 Set up in 1948, it includes works by the Missão de Estudos das Pescas de Angola (Study Mission on Fishing in 
Angola), as it was called from 1951 onwards.  
91 See Mário Ruivo, art. cit., pp. 355 and ff. 
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their contribution to the administration of fishing in the period of the dictatorship was as much a 
caricature as it was the truth.92  
    
Conclusions  
 
In the postwar world, accepting that marine resources were “common property” and 
appreciating that the management of fishing required both multilateral study and the resolution of 
its essential problem - the vicious cycle of scarcity and falling yields for firms - were rare and 
controversial attitudes. Nevertheless, the impetus provided by the practical evidence of the shortage 
of fish in certain zones of the Ocean was at least as strong as that provided by the diagnoses and 
theoretical formulations from science, in relation to “overfishing”, its causes and bio-economic 
effects. But the intrusion of any other perspective (from biology and economics) into political 
decision-making by the Portuguese government was slow. In the changed world of the “Cold War” 
and with the emergence of new nation-states, the primary concern of governments was to 
territorialize resources and to map abundance, rather than to introduce measures to prevent the 
scarcity from worsening. 
This conduct on the part of the public authorities did not prevent the establishment of 
various intergovernmental bodies to study the fishing of species with high commercial value. Their 
action presumed concerted research and the implementation of measures, negotiated and implanted 
on a multilateral basis. 
Extolling the “national importance” of the cod campaign both for the public supply and for 
the stimulation of the economic and social life of the main cod ports - often through the use of 
historicist arguments and recourse to propaganda - the Portuguese Estado Novo agreed without 
hesitation to such principles of multilateralism in order to defend the interests it considered relevant. 
Astonishing as it may seem, the Portuguese dictatorial regime’s concession to cooperative practices, 
which, for the first time, required multilateral scrutiny and management of the cod fisheries in the 
Northwest Atlantic, was justified by the importance of deep-sea fishing for supplying the people. 
The survival of the cod fisheries in this new international scenario did, in fact, imply that 
Portugal become part of a number of intergovernmental organizations. These agreements, by 
demanding unprecedented commitments to external cooperation in scientific research into the sea, 
ended up generating flows of knowledge and giving the few Portuguese specialists involved in these 
organizations advance preparation in the area of marine biology and the Law of the Sea. 
The example of ICNAF seems fairly illustrative and could also motivate a re-reading of the 
almost unequivocal characterization that is usually given to Salazarist foreign policy. From another 
angle, this essay may actually confirm the limits of the “fundamental truths” of the New State’s 
foreign policy and its subordination to the pragmatism of interests in the postwar context. An 
analysis of Portugal’s involvement in the creation of ICNAF and in the dynamics of this 
intergovernmental organization, created through a US initiative in 1948, does not, however, permit 
a metonymic conclusion. Portugal’s participation in ICNAF is not enough to contradict Salazar’s 
resistance to any concessions in terms of foreign policy, or at least in terms of the “sacred principle” 
of the sovereign and “national” decision, even one created in bilateral forms. 
                                                
92 Evidence from Professor Mário Ruivo (Lisbon, 20.4.2001). 
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Even so, the multilateral competences of ICNAF that we can see, and the efforts at regulation 
that the member countries agreed to implement lead one to believe that the management of the 
Northwest Atlantic fisheries came to rely on the practice of sharing information, with some scientific 
support. Despite the instrumentalization which the work of the Portuguese “biologists” working at 
ICNAF sought to achieve, cod fishing had never before aroused such great meticulousness in 
diagnosing its possibilities and disseminating statistics on the activities of fishing fleets and on their 
effects on the evolution of biological reserves. The cod fisheries ceased to be a strictly national matter; 
maintaining or expanding them implied subjecting boats, men and fishing technologies, as well as 
the public policies for regulating the sector, to principles of mutual, multilateral surveillance. 
The part played by the Portuguese authorities in the creation and functioning of ICNAF 
merely comprises a fine example of the exception that proves the rule; an exception that was 
acquiesced to in the absence of political implications capable of rocking the foundations of the 
regime. In this, as in other domains, multilateralism was just a small test, pragmatic and necessary, 
following the convergence of the interests involved and the expression of their oligarchies within the 
state’s institutions. It is not even odd that, in order to maintain the viability of the political project of 
the cod campaign against the flow of the external changes to the Law of the Sea and the very scarcity 
of resources that became apparent between the 1950s and 1970s, it was the corporatist oligarchy that 
mobilized the state and dictated the diplomatic strategies to be followed by the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs. 
As happened in the wider sphere of Portugal’s participation in the movements and 
institutions of European economic cooperation in the postwar era, marked by the pragmatism of 
Salazar, by baffling diplomatic advances and retreats, the integration of Portugal into ICNAF gave 
rise to unheard of external commitments. But one thing is sure: the concession to multilateral 
principles and practices was minimal and never clashed with any of the “invincible truths” of 
Salazar’s regime: the integrity of the State and the Nation, the authoritarian nature of the political 
system, and colonial integralism. 
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Source: Biblioteca IPIMAR, Pasta Conferência de Washington – Fevereiro de 1949, “Relatório dos Delegados do 
Ministério da Marinha”. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
